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THE MUTUAL FUND BOARD: A FAILED 
EXPERIMENT IN REGULATORY 
OUTSOURCING 
Alan R. Palmiter* 
There is no there there.1 
Mutual fund boards are a curious institution. Mandated by the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, they are tasked as “watchdog” 
supervisors of the management firms that organize, administer and market 
mutual funds.2 The fund board and its “independent” directors approve fund 
transactions with the management firm and ensure compliance with the 
1940 Act and implementing SEC rules. Fund directors thus function as 
outsourced regulators, with their selection and compensation in the hands of 
the management firm they supervise. 
This essay argues that the outsourcing to mutual fund boards of key 
regulatory functions—principally the review and approval of management 
contracts—has not lived up to the hopes of the 1940 Act. Fund boards have 
been weak and even feckless protectors of fund investors, their deficiencies 
exacerbated as mutual funds have grown into the leading investment vehicle 
for private retirement savings in the United States. 
Gauged by the important metric of management fees—whose 
negotiation is delegated to fund boards—the experiment in regulatory 
outsourcing has failed. As the mutual fund industry has grown in size and 
scope, the fund board has shown itself to be mostly ineffective in 
negotiating on behalf of fund investors to realize the value from improved 
information technologies and growing economies of scale. Study after study 
finds fund expense ratios growing over a period when fund assets have 
exploded. 
Just as significant as their poor performance in negotiating lower 
management fees, fund boards have also failed in their supervision of fund 
design and marketing. Fund boards, charged with the approval of fund 
mergers and dissolutions, have acquiesced in the strategy of many fund 
groups of creating a stable of “above average” funds by merging losers into 
winners. Fund groups then heavily market the resulting winners (also an 
activity subject to board supervision) by appealing to the “past is prologue” 
mentality of many fund investors. Fund boards have failed to respond to the 
“cognitive biases” of fund investors, a problem aggravated by the shift of 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. My thanks to Jim Fanto and Ahmed Taha for 
commenting on an earlier draft, and to Jeff Wolfe and Min He for their research help. 
 1. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 298–300 (1937) (describing how, 
after returning to California from a lecture tour, Stein sought to visit her childhood home in 
Oakland, but could not find the house). 
 2. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979). 
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retirement savings from employer-managed defined-benefit plans to 
employee-managed defined-contribution plans. 
Why has the fund board failed? The structure of the board has hobbled 
its ability to function as originally envisioned. “Independent directors” are 
selected and nominated by the management firm, subject to a perfunctory 
“rubber stamp” by fund investors. The fund board is composed of part-
timers who rely on the fund’s management firm for information, direction 
and compensation. Even if they wanted to, the fund directors cannot 
realistically threaten to take the fund’s business elsewhere. Negotiation on 
behalf of fund investors is understandably an empty ritual. 
More deeply, the fund board operates without meaningful oversight. 
Each overseer envisioned by the 1940 Act—the SEC, federal courts and 
state courts—has deferred to fund directors on the hopeful assumption that 
oversight will come from elsewhere. Despite regular and continuing 
attempts by the SEC to strengthen board independence, the agency has 
failed to create true board independence or to give the board clear guidance. 
Federal courts, though called on to oversee the board’s setting of 
management fees, have refused to become mired in valuing management 
services. State courts accept the bedrock principles of the business 
judgment rule, thus presuming that fund directors act on an informed basis 
with a rational basis, in good faith, and without a conflicting personal 
interest. 
Director professionalism, part of a relatively recent “best practices” 
movement in the mutual fund industry, offers some promise—but at most 
can only be aspirational. It does not correct the structural impediments of 
the fund board or create mechanisms that would oversee fund directors. 
Although fund directors have become more aware of their functions and 
responsibilities, they continue to be diffident, highly-paid actors in the face 
of a fund management culture that focuses on building market share, asset 
size, and profits. Against these odds, director professionalism has little 
chance. 
Ultimately, the mutual fund regulatory regime places its faith in the 
fund investor market—despite the animating premise of the 1940 Act that 
disclosure-based market protection is inadequate. Recent studies make clear 
that fund investors continue to be inept consumers, plagued by 
informational and cognitive biases. Fund investors are largely ignorant of 
fund expenses, the relationship of expenses to fund performance, and the 
mixed relevance of past performance to future returns. They respond only 
weakly to no-load funds and low fees, and even less to changes in fees and 
fund risk. The dysfunctional investor market is fueled by fund marketing 
(approved by fund boards) that shapes and reinforces investor biases. 
This essay first reviews the creation and development of mutual fund 
boards, examining their composition and their intended regulatory role. It 
considers the institutions charged with overseeing fund boards (the SEC 
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and courts) and the deference they have shown to fund boards. The essay 
then presents empirical data on the performance of fund boards drawn 
largely from the finance literature, data that uniformly suggest that fund 
boards have failed to adequately supervise fund management firms. Finally, 
the essay considers various proposed reforms to mutual fund governance 
and offers a comparison to foreign mutual funds, whose regulatory systems 
operate without fund boards. Imagine! 
I. MUTUAL FUND BOARDS—OUTSOURCED SUPERVISOR 
The board of directors is a defining feature of the corporate structure 
that was adopted by the U.S. mutual fund industry at its inception. The 
Investment Company Act of 1940 built on this edifice, giving special 
gatekeeper functions to the board and its “independent directors.” Over 
time, the SEC has delegated additional responsibilities to the fund board. 
Under the resulting board-centric structure, the fund board (in theory) 
supervises the activities of the mutual fund management firm.3 The fund 
board carries out its supervisory functions with minimal oversight. 
A. CORPORATE STRUCTURE: FROM THE BEGINNING 
Investment companies in the United States are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. The first was organized as a corporation in 1924. U.S. 
investors were more comfortable with the corporate form, with its 
supervisory board of directors, compared to the British model of investment 
trusts that had developed in the late nineteenth century.4 The corporation, 
unlike the trust, offered an internal supervisory mechanism to oversee the 
discretion of the portfolio manager. In the late 1920s investment companies 
flourished. 
Besides supplying a supervisory board of directors, the corporate form 
offered other advantages. It permitted the investment company to issue 
various classes of securities—common and preferred stock, debentures, and 
mortgage bonds. This facilitated leverage for equity investors, promising 
them above-market returns in a booming market.5 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of 
Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 956–58 (1994) (evaluating the comparative 
merits of the structure and governance of the two dominant forms of mutual funds). 
 4. The trust permitted investors to buy an interest in a portfolio of securities deposited with a 
trust company. The trust company committed itself to rules regarding the kinds of securities to be 
purchased, holding periods, and management of the investment portfolio. JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 47–48 (1988). 
 5. The 1940 Act prohibits leverage by open-end mutual funds, both for investors and in the 
fund’s portfolio. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (2000) (prohibiting open-end funds from issuing senior 
(debt) securities to investors); Id. § 80a-18(f), (g) (prohibiting open-end funds from borrowing 
money except temporarily, but not in excess of 5% of the total fund assets, or from a bank unless 
subject to a 300% asset-coverage condition). 
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In addition, corporate law (unlike the more rigid law of trusts) 
permitted a wide range of self-dealing transactions—if approved by the 
corporation’s disinterested board of directors. The sponsor, typically a 
financial services firm that had brought the investment company into 
existence, could manage the investment portfolio and receive fees. 
Sponsoring investment banks could sell securities to their investment 
companies, often securities the banks themselves brought to market. 
Sponsoring securities firms could sell brokerage services, while commercial 
banks could lend money, to their captive investment companies. 
In 1940 when Congress got around to regulating investment companies, 
it grafted its regulatory scheme onto the existing corporate structure and 
placed its faith in the fund board as a substitute for investor self-reliance.6 
Congress noted that disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had not deterred “the continuous abuses in 
the organization and operation of investment companies.”7 Generally these 
acts provide only for publicity, but “the record is clear that publicity alone 
is insufficient to eliminate malpractices in investment companies.”8 
Having found supervision by fund boards inadequate in the 1920s, 
Congress oddly chose to strengthen the hand of the board. For many abuses 
identified by Congress—such as preferential trading by insiders, dilutive 
pricing of portfolio shares, exorbitant selling charges, undisclosed and 
unapproved changes in investment policies, unauthorized transfers to new 
management firms, self-dealing sales of worthless securities, borrowings by 
insiders without repayment, and lack of transparency on fund finances—the 
solution was greater board supervision.9 
Although the 1940 Act does not require the corporate form, the 
regulatory regime effectively assumes that mutual funds will be organized 
as (or along the lines of) a corporation. There must be a board of directors 
(or its equivalent) to oversee fund operations and approve contractual 
arrangements with the fund’s service providers.10 There must be 
shareholder voting to elect board members and approve fundamental 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See generally Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U. L.Q. 
303 (1941); Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (1969); Comment, Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440 
(1941). 
 7. INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 10 (3d Sess. 1940). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Paul F. Roye, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Am. 
Law Inst./Am. Bar Ass’n Inv. Co. Regulation and Compliance Conference, The Exciting World of 
Inv. Co. Regulation (June 14, 2001), reprinted in Tamar Frankel & Clifford E. Kirsch, 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION, at 32–33 (3d ed. 2005).  
 10. Investment Company Act of 1940, in 6-83 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 83.01 
(Matthew Bender 2006). 
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changes.11 These requirements apply whether the fund is structured as a 
corporation or another form such as a business trust. 
Outsourcing to the fund board of a supervisory/regulatory function was 
consistent with the general approach of the securities laws. The Securities 
Act of 1933 delegated supervision of public securities offerings to non-
governmental watchdogs—namely, the directors and officers of the issuer, 
the underwriter and the financial auditor. The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 delegated supervision of trading in public markets to self-regulated 
stock exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers. In each 
case, the SEC and the courts retained a significant oversight role. 
Oversight of the fund board, however, is lacking in the 1940 Act. There 
was—and still is—no self-regulatory oversight body. The SEC is not tasked 
with reviewing the fund board’s ongoing approval of the fund’s 
management contracts and marketing arrangements. The courts, though 
later assigned a role to oversee management fees, have shunned the 
responsibility. For both the SEC and the courts, more daunting than the 
volume of fund transactions has been the problem of valuation of 
management services. The federal securities regime assiduously avoids 
delegating questions of value to the SEC or the courts, instead leaving them 
to markets. In the case of mutual funds, given the doubts about the 
efficiency of the investor market, the question of value was left to private 
negotiations between the fund board and the management firm. It was a 
desperate (and overly hopeful) delegation. 
B. FUND BOARDS: COMPOSITION AND SELECTION 
The 1940 Act regulates the composition and election of fund directors. 
A centerpiece of the 1940 Act is the requirement that at least 40 percent of 
the board be independent of the management firm.12 Beyond the statutory 
requirement, current SEC rules condition the use of the more important 
exemptions on a board composed of a majority of independent directors—
creating a de facto regulatory minimum.13 A proposed rule, still in limbo, 
would increase the proportion to 75 percent and require an independent 
board chair.14 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Mutual funds must adopt fundamental policies as to key investment activities—capital 
structure, permissible investments, investment strategies, risk-reward profile of securities issued 
by the fund—which can then be changed only by shareholder vote. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8(b), 
80a-13(a) (2000). 
 12. Id. § 80a-10(a) (providing that at least 40% of board of directors of registered investment 
company must consist of individuals who are not “interested persons”). 
 13. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 2, 2001). 
 14. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 
Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (July 27, 2004). In June 2005, the D.C. Circuit found that the SEC had 
acted within its authority in adopting the governance rules, but had violated the Administrative 
Procedures Act by not adequately considering (1) the costs of complying with the governance 
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The 1940 Act dictates that shareholders elect fund directors, but only 
for the initial board and to fill vacancies if less than a majority of the board 
is shareholder-elected.15 Thus, funds operate without annual board 
elections.16 Independent directors must be nominated by a majority of 
independent directors and elected by shareholders, though vacancies can be 
filled by the board in the case of the death, disqualification, or bona fide 
resignation of an independent director where there remain sufficient 
shareholder-elected directors.17 
These rules have not, however, created an independent institution of 
fund supervisors. The definition of “interested person” makes it relatively 
easy to seat outside directors sympathetic to management firm interests.18 
Independent directors are typically securities industry executives and 
professionals whose firms provide direct or indirect services to mutual 
funds. There are no qualification standards for fund directors.19 
Compensation for service on mutual fund boards, particularly for larger 
mutual fund families, is typically much higher than for service on boards of 
                                                                                                                 
rules and (2) disclosure requirements as an alternative. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 
133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005). After compiling a more developed record of the costs of the new rule, 
the SEC re-adopted it. See Commission Response to Remand by Court of Appeals, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (June 30, 2005). In April 2006, the D.C. 
Circuit vacated the rule on the ground that the Commission had not adequately considered its cost, 
but withheld the issuance of the mandate for ninety days to afford the Commission an opportunity 
to reopen the record for comment. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (2000) (permitting board vacancies to be filled by the board so long 
as at least two-thirds of the board remains shareholder-elected). The SEC has taken the position 
that, beyond the election of the initial board and the filling of vacancies when required by the 
statute, the requirement of annual meetings is generally a matter of state law. JOHN NUVEEN & 
CO. INC., SEC No-Action Letter [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,383 
(Nov. 18, 1986). 
 16. The fund must be organized in a state that does not require an annual shareholders 
meeting—a dispensation offered by states looking to attract mutual fund incorporation. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806 (2006) (generally permitting voting practices that comply with federal 
rules); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 2-501(b)(1) (2006) (same). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(b). 
 18. For example, executives of brokerage firms are considered “not interested,” so long as 
their firm has not executed trades for the mutual fund group in the previous six months. See 
U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(v), (B)(v) (West 2006). The same six-month waiting period applies to 
executives of banks and other lenders to the mutual fund group. See id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vi), 
(B)(vi). In addition, former officials or business associates of the management firm are considered 
independent after a two-year waiting period. See id. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii), (B)(vii) (permitting 
SEC by order to determine that executives who had a “material business or professional 
relationship” with the mutual fund group lack independence, but only if the relationship arose in 
the prior two years). See generally Larry D. Barnett, When is a Mutual Fund Director 
Independent? The Unexplored Role of Professional Relationships under Section 2(a)(19) of the 
Investment Company Act, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 155 (2006). 
 19. Chris Tobe, Mutual Fund Directors: Governance Changes Proposed for Independent 
Directors in the U.S., 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 25, 28 (2000) (pointing out that fund experience is 
not a prerequisite to board service). 
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operating companies.20 Moreover, the rules on director tenure discourage 
new blood on the board.21 Thus, most fund boards are composed of 
industry-friendly, highly paid, long-serving directors. The lack of 
independence of mutual fund directors, even those who carry the label “not 
interested,” has long been an open secret.22 
When the election of directors does occur, the process is “largely 
ritualistic.”23 The management firm selects the initial board, and new 
directors (including independent directors) are vetted by the management 
firm.24 In the 60 years of mutual fund regulation in the United States, no 
director nominees have ever been presented to oppose the management 
slate. Fund shareholders have little choice (if they bother to vote) but to 
rubber stamp nominees proffered by the management firm.25 There is no 
incentive to undertake the expense of a proxy fight. Any fund shareholder 
dissatisfied with the management firm’s directors would have sold long 
before. 
C. FUND BOARD: SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS 
The fund board has two essential functions: (1) negotiating and 
approving the contract with the management firm (thus setting the terms 
and price of the asset management and marketing services provided fund 
investors) and (2) supervising the compliance of the management firm and 
other service providers with the legal requirements of the 1940 Act 
regulatory scheme.26 
                                                                                                                 
 20. For example, the compensation of the seven independent directors of T. Rowe Price was 
increased for 2005 from $150,000 per year to $190,000 per year (the independent chair from 
$215,000 to $290,000). See T. Rowe Price Family of Funds 17 (Feb. 28, 2006), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/75170/000087183906000015/finalproxy06.htm. 
 21. Since shareholders must elect new directors only when the number of shareholder-elected 
directors falls below two-thirds of the board, there is a premium on long-serving incumbents and a 
penalty against installing new directors. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 22. Robert H. Mundheim & William J. Nutt, The Independent Directors of Mutual Funds, 
WHARTON Q., Spring 1972, at 8, 8. 
 23. Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation under the Investment Company Act—A Reevaluation of 
the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 903, 
908 (1981). 
 24. William J. Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 
215–16 (1971). 
 25. As the SEC has noted, passivity of fund shareholders is the norm. Mutual funds often find 
it difficult to obtain a quorum for shareholder meeting, and the voting outcome is almost always 
consistent with the wishes of the management firm. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING 
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 272 n.82 (1992) 
[hereinafter SEC Staff Report Protecting Investors]. 
 26. James H. Cheek, III, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility, 59 BUS. LAW. 145, 150–54 (2003) (identifying board responsibilities with respect 
to investment advisory arrangements, distributions arrangements, and other statutory and 
regulatory responsibilities). 
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In each area, independent directors have a critical monitoring role. As 
explained in a recent report by the SEC staff on the virtues of an 
independent board: 
[R]eliance is placed on the independent directors, rather than the 
Commission, to oversee any conflicts of interest in the transactions 
permitted by the rules and to protect the interests of fund investors.27  
Ultimately, the fund board insulates the management firm from direct 
regulatory oversight.28 The fund board relieves the SEC (or another 
oversight body) from responsibility for supervising the management firm 
and reviewing its fee arrangements with the fund. The board legitimates the 
management firm as a profit-seeking business. 
1. Contract Negotiation and Approval 
The 1940 Act requires that the fund board annually approve the 
investment advisory and underwriting agreements between the fund and the 
management firm.29 This board is responsible for negotiating and setting the 
advisory fees and responsibilities of the management firm, the 
arrangements for buying and selling portfolio investments, and the fund’s 
marketing approach. 
The regulatory scheme places the fee-setting responsibility on the 
board—rather than fund investors, the SEC or the courts. Given the 
“ponderous task” of evaluating fees and other costs, the regulatory scheme 
assumes that fund investors are incapable of valuing fund management 
services and the task would overwhelm the SEC.30 Over time, fund fees 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Exemptive Rule Amendments of 2004: The Independent 
Chair Condition, A Report in Accordance with the consolidated Appropriations Act 16 
(Unpublished Working Paper, April 2005), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf 
[hereinafter SEC Staff Report on Independent Chair]. This reliance on independent directors 
reflects the policy decision in the 1940 Act to subject conflicts transactions in the mutual fund not 
to “fairness” review by an external decision-maker, such as the SEC or the courts, but rather to 
oversight by the relatively untested institution of outside directors. Id. at 9–11. 
 28. The fund board also insulates the management firm from investor litigation. Under state 
corporate law, shareholder derivative suits can be commenced only after the shareholder makes a 
demand for board action or pleads the futility of demand. Thus, the board serves as a gatekeeper 
for investor litigation. If an investor challenges illegal conduct by the management firm, the board 
(or a committee of independent directors) can conduct an investigation and make a business 
judgment as to the merits of the claim. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce 
Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of 
Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1026–28 (2005). 
 29. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2), (b)(1) (2000) (requiring annual approval of multi-year 
agreements by either the board of directors or majority vote of the shareholders). The investment 
advisory agreement must also be approved initially by a majority of voting shares. See id.  
§ 80a-15(a). 
 30. See Wang, supra note 3, at 988. 
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have become increasingly complex, with different kinds of sales charges 
(front-end, contingent deferred, and 12b-1 fees) and expense ratios.31 
Fee setting by the fund board involves a negotiation ritual that begins 
with the management firm proposing fees that the board (sometimes) 
suggests be lowered. The management firm then accepts whatever 
marginally lower fees it concludes the market can bear. Take the recent fee 
negotiation at AIM, a large mutual fund group targeted in the market-
trading scandals that came to light in 2003. To resolve charges that the fund 
group had allowed favored clients to skim profits from long-term investors 
through rapid trading in and out of funds, AIM (and its affiliated Invesco 
group) agreed to reduce fees charged to investors by $75 million over 5 
years.32 In 2005, management proposed a fee reduction of $17 million. 
When independent directors demanded further cuts of $3 million, 
management “winced” and agreed.33 These amounts, however, pale in 
comparison to the $742 million in annual revenues for the fund group on 
$64 billion in assets under management.34 
The fund board’s cabined role is not for lack of formal authority. 
Delegation to the management firm does not strip the board of its authority 
under state law to “manage and direct” the business and affairs of the 
fund.35 Nonetheless, the board is ill equipped and ill situated to do more. It 
has no independent staff to advise it on matters of investment policy, fund 
operations, or fund design. It has no realistic option (or threat) to hire a new 
investment adviser or management firm. And the regulatory structure of the 
1940 Act prevents the board from undertaking radical reforms like changing 
the fee structure from asset-based fees to performance-based fees.36 
                                                                                                                 
 31. There are two primary visible fees: sales charges and expense ratios. Sales charges are paid 
by the investor when shares are purchased (front-end load) or when shares are redeemed 
(contingent deferred sales load). Beyond the load, funds can charge for marketing and advertising 
expenses through “12b-1” distribution fees. See Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by 
Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 
16,431, 41 SEC Docket 207 (June 13, 1988) (describing legislative and administrative history 
leading to adoption of Rule 12b-1). 
  The expense ratio covers the operational services provided by the management firm—
namely, investment management, administration (record-keeping and transaction services to fund 
investors), and operating expenses (custodial fees, taxes, legal and auditing expenses, and 
directors’ fees). See JOHN C. BOGLE, BOGLE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 197–201 (1994). In addition, 
funds pay for trading costs (brokerage fees) that are charged against fund assets. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-551T, MUTUAL FUNDS: INFORMATION ON TRENDS IN FEES AND 
THEIR RELATED DISCLOSURE 1 (2003) [hereinafter GAO Mutual Fund Fee Report]. 
 32. Tom Lauricella, Independent Directors Strike Back, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at R4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006). 
 36. See generally John C. Bogle, Founder and Former Chairman of the Vanguard Group, 
Remarks to the Boston College Law School, Re-Mutualizing the Mutual Fund Industry—The 
Alpha & The Omega (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/sp2004 
0121.html (discussing fund directors’ refusal to change the fee structure). 
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2. Compliance Office 
The fund board also functions as a compliance office, a role outlined in 
the 1940 Act and enlarged significantly by SEC rules.37 The board is tasked 
with reviewing and approving specified fund practices to regulate conflicts 
between the fund and the management firm, and to ensure the management 
firm is in regulatory compliance.38 By the SEC’s count, the fund board is 
called on under the 1940 Act and its rules to review and approve fund 
transactions in 27 different situations, some of which are delegated to the 
full board, while others are delegated only to independent directors. 
Some compliance functions delegated to the full board include:39 
• valuation of portfolio securities that do not have a readily-ascertainable 
market price 
• setting the time of day when net asset value is determined 
• approval of custody contracts (annually) with members of national 
securities exchanges, clearing agencies, book-entry systems, and 
foreign custodians 
• approval of the fund’s code of ethics, which must be designed to 
prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices by management 
firm insiders in connection with personal securities transactions. 
Other compliance functions are delegated only to independent directors, on 
whom the SEC has “relied extensively” to exempt funds from prohibitions 
under the 1940 Act:40 
• approval of 12b-1 fees (marketing fees paid from fund assets, as 
opposed to loads paid by fund investors when buying and selling 
shares)41 
• approval of the fund’s auditor (which must be an independent public 
accountant) 
• approval of securities transactions with the management firm (or its 
affiliates) as permitted by various SEC rules 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Wang, supra note 3, at 996–1001. Interestingly, the shift of regulatory oversight from 
the SEC to fund boards arose mostly from 1975–2000, a period characterized by SEC rule-making 
that exempted management firms from conflict-of-interest prohibitions of the 1940 Act on the 
condition of approval by independent directors. See Tamar Frankel, The Scope and Jurisprudence 
of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 939, 946 (2005) [hereinafter 
Frankel, Jurisprudence of Regulation] (providing detailed list). 
 38. See Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. OF ECON. 
PERSP. 161, 162 (2004) (describing cash flow in mutual funds and the resulting incentives facing 
fund managers, brokers, and other third parties and the associated conflicts of interest). 
 39. Wang, supra note 3, at 994. 
 40. SEC Staff Report on Independent Chair, supra note 27, at 16. 
 41. In adopting Rule 12b-1 (which permits use of fund assets to defray marketing expenses), 
the SEC commented that “the more capable the disinterested directors are of overseeing the kinds 
of activities of investment companies which are of regulatory significance, the more the 
Commission will be willing to reduce the regulatory restrictions.” Bearing of Distribution 
Expenses by Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 6254, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 11,414, 21 SEC Docket 324 (Oct. 28, 1980). 
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• determination (annually) whether participation in joint liability 
insurance policies is in the best interests of the fund 
• review and approval of fidelity bonds. 
The compliance function is largely ministerial, with the board checking 
off items on the SEC-provided checklist. Recognizing the emptiness of the 
compliance function, the SEC has tried to relieve boards of some of the 
tedium, replacing annual review in a number of areas with board action 
“only when necessary.”42 
Compliance outsourcing to the board and independent directors, 
however, is not all encompassing. Certain conflict transactions cannot be 
approved by the board or its independent directors, but instead require SEC 
approval. For example, transactions with the management firm beyond 
those specified in the advisory agreement are prohibited unless they receive 
prior approval from the SEC.43 Authorization by the board is not enough. 
In performing its compliance function, the board is under no obligation 
to set up internal controls and rarely acts as an investigator of management 
firm compliance.44 Not surprisingly, fund directors rarely discover 
compliance lapses.45 Instead, illegality is typically uncovered by the auditor 
or government regulator with the help of a whistle-blower in the 
management firm.46 For example, fund boards were largely absent in 
identifying or moving to correct the late-trading and market-timing scandals 
that shook the mutual fund industry in 2003.47 It was the New York 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See Frankel, Jurisprudence of Regulation, supra note 37, at 986 (summarizing the 1993 
change, which was “intended to enhance the effectiveness of investment company boards by 
substituting more meaningful requirements for an annual review requirement” such as requiring 
“that directors make and approve changes only when necessary”). 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), (b) (2000). Under § 17(a), the management firm cannot 
“knowingly” sell or purchase securities to or from the mutual fund, except when the fund is 
redeeming its own shares or selling them to its investors. Similar restrictions apply to borrowing 
from and lending to the mutual fund. Id. Under § 17(b), however, the management firm can apply 
to the SEC for an order exempting a proposed transaction. By statute, the SEC is to consider 
whether the proposed terms are reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching, and whether 
the proposed transaction is consistent with the mutual fund’s investment policies. Id. 
 44. Some have speculated that board passivity is a product of the mind-numbing compliance 
functions entrusted to it. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Money Market Funds, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 913, 
915 n.18 (1981) (suggesting that increased compliance tasks and fees paid by fund advisors causes 
directors to become more susceptible to control by the management firm). 
 45. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 597, 617–19 (1982) (discussing court cases where independent directors failed to 
challenge management self-dealing). 
 46. See Paul E. Kanjorski, Congressman, Remarks during House Hearing, Mutual Funds: 
Who’s Looking Out for Investors? 109, 127 (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://commdocs.house. 
gov/committees/bank/hba92982.000/hba92982_1.htm (“[W]e really do not have inside capacity to 
understand what these organizations are doing until a whistleblower comes forward or until an 
extreme situation occurs where we focus a great deal of light on the subject.”). 
 47. Mercer E. Bullard, Comments on Martin Lybecker’s Enhanced Corporate Governance, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1095, 1098–1101 (2005) [hereinafter Bullard, Comments on Corporate 
Governance]. “[M]utual fund scandal was the best evidence that in practice [independent 
directors] are not effective watchdogs.” Id. at 1102–03. 
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Attorney General, followed by the SEC, who investigated and exposed 
most of the illegal and fraudulent practices.48 
The attitude of management firms toward the compliance function is 
captured by a vignette told by Professor Tamar Frankel: 
It was rumored that Securities and Exchange Commission’s examiners 
would form monitoring groups. These groups would sit at the offices of 
large mutual fund Managers, and supervise their operations, the way FDIC 
agents sit at large bank offices. Asked for a reaction to this action, I was 
told in confidence how a senior Manager in one large fund complex 
reacted. He said something like: “That is sheer waste of money. No one 
would speak to these monitors and they will be put in a box and 
forgotten.” I was astounded. Here was a golden opportunity to gain the 
best guarantee of honesty at no cost. It was an opportunity to show the 
world and the regulators that this fund complex had nothing to hide. I 
expected the Managers to receive the government monitors with open 
arms, show them around, and offer them a comfortable office from which 
to supervise and hopefully report and advertise the fund complex’s 
compliance with the law. This Manager did not expect the investors to 
value trust.49  
The SEC has implicitly acknowledged the inadequacies of the fund 
board in its compliance function. In the rules responding to the late-trading 
and market-timing scandals of 2003, the SEC required management firms to 
appoint a compliance officer with significant authority and direct access to 
the fund board.50 The SEC stated the hope that these internal compliance 
officers would serve as whistle-blowers and alert the SEC to non-
compliance by recalcitrant management firms. The implicit doubts about 
the fund board could not have been more obvious. 
D. DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT 
The fund board performs its supervisory and compliance functions with 
only minimal external oversight. The 1940 Act gives the SEC only limited 
authority, and fund investors even less, to challenge fund directors in 
federal court. Federal courts, consistent with the apparent intent of the 
legislation, have shunned meaningful review of board activities, particularly 
with respect to the setting of management fees. Instead, the 1940 Act 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage, and the 
SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2006) (noting that 
the scandals resulted in dozens of civil and criminal prosecutions and billions in monetary 
sanctions). Mutual fund scandals revolved around fund practices that allowed favored institutional 
traders to engage in fund arbitrage, which involves buying fund shares at a discount and 
redeeming them once the price has been corrected, with profits coming from other fund 
shareholders. Id. at 1285. 
 49. Frankel, Jurisprudence of Regulation, supra note 37, at 956. 
 50. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investors 
Company Act Release 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
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assumes that directors will be accountable as a matter of state fiduciary law 
and directorial professionalism. State courts have deferred to fund boards 
under the business judgment rule and state procedural rules on pre-suit 
demand. A fledgling movement for more professionalism on fund boards 
offers some hope, but is constrained by the structural weaknesses of the 
fund board—and ultimately carries no legal weight. 
1. SEC Oversight 
The SEC has been diffident in its oversight of the fund board.51 Besides 
regular (mostly hollow) calls for greater board independence and authority, 
the SEC has done little to make fund governance more responsive to 
investor needs. The SEC has not armed directors with the information and 
other resources to effectively bargain on behalf of fund investors.52 The 
SEC has not brought enforcement actions against fund directors for 
nonfeasance in negotiating fund fees or controlling excesses in fund 
marketing.53 The SEC has neither sued management firms to challenge their 
fees nor filed amicus briefs in support of investor litigation making such 
charges.54 In short, the SEC has stood by the design of the 1940 Act regime 
to outsource regulatory supervision of the management firm to the fund 
board. 
The SEC’s recent efforts to increase board independence,55 far from 
introducing major reforms in board governance, largely codify existing 
industry practices: 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Tobe, supra note 19, at 27 (“‘[F]und directors have done an outstanding job.’” (quoting 
SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman)). 
 52. For example, the SEC does not require that management firms disclose their profits to their 
fund boards. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: the Cost of 
Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 656–58 (2001) (itemizing SEC inaction). 
 53. Under § 36(a) of the 1940 Act, the SEC has (limited) authority to seek injunctive action 
against fund directors for the “breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-35(a) (2000) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, Title I, § 36) (action in 
federal court against any person who “serves or acts” for a registered investment company). 
Section 36 of the 1940 Act is hereinafter cited as 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35. Under § 36(b) of the 1940 
Act, the SEC (along with fund investors) can also sue fund directors and the management firm 
“for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of [management] compensation.” Id. § 80a-35(b). In 
addition, the SEC could also sue fund directors to enjoin the “violation of any provision of this 
title, or of any rule, regulation, or order hereunder.” Id. § 80a-41(d) (Supp. II 2002).   
 54. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 656. 
 55. In 2001 the SEC conditioned its ten most commonly used exemptive rules on a board 
composed of a majority of outside directors. Role of Independent Directors of Investment 
Companies, Securities Act No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001). The rule also required that funds 
disclose the fund shares held by directors, including independent directors. In 2004 the SEC 
sought to increase the proportion of disinterested directors to 75% and add a requirement that the 
board chair be a disinterested director. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (July 27, 2004). The rule also would enable 
disinterested directors to hire their own staff and lawyers, and to caucus among themselves. 
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The rule [mandating a majority of independent directors] will accomplish 
little. The board majority requirement is nothing but a warmed-over 
rehash of an SEC Investment Management Division proposal advanced 
eight years ago. Worse it is beside the point. Today, many, if not most, 
funds have a majority of directors who are supposed to be independent of 
the external advisor to keep fees and expenses in line. In many cases, 
funds’ independent directors already populate funds’ nominating 
committees [since funds with Rule 12b-1 plans must have self-nominating 
independent directors].56 
The SEC has also turned its attention to improving disclosure to fund 
investors. Since 1988, the SEC has required that mutual fund prospectuses 
include a fee table showing fund fees and charges as a percentage of net 
assets.57 In 2004, the SEC required that funds disclose in tabular form (in 
their semi-annual and annual reports) the cost in dollars of an investment of 
$1,000 that earned the fund’s actual return and incurred the fund’s actual 
expenses during that fiscal period.58 Funds must also explain the types of 
costs charged to the fund, not just provide an operating expense ratio—
though the SEC does not require a break-down of different fees and 
operating expenses. 
The SEC, however, has rejected individualized disclosure in account 
statements of actual expenses paid by investors—disclosure strongly 
recommended in a 2004 GAO report on fee transparency.59 The GAO 
asserted “seeing the specific dollar amount paid on shares owned could be 
the incentive that some investors need to take action to compare their fund’s 
expenses to those of other funds and make more informed investment 
decisions on this basis.”60 The SEC concluded such disclosure would not 
show fees at comparable funds and was concerned about costs for 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 657–58. In addition, the use of outside counsel is 
widespread, given the encouragement of the practice by federal courts. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 
552 F.2d 402, 428 (2d Cir. 1977) (recommending that independent directors receive advice from 
independent counsel, rather than counsel for the management firm). 
 57. See Consolidated Disclosure of Mutual Fund Expenses, Investors Company Act Release 
No. 16,244, 53 Fed. Reg. 3192 (1988) (amending Item 3 of Form N-1A to require disclosure of 
the fund’s expense ratio). The SEC-mandated disclosure received poor marks. See Robert A. 
Robertson, In Search of the Perfect Mutual Fund Prospectus, 54 BUS. LAW. 461, 475 (1999). 
 58. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8393 [2003-2004 transfer binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,148 at 89,253 (May 10, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Fund Expense Adopting 
Release]. 
 59. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-317T, MUTUAL FUNDS: ADDITIONAL 
DISCLOSURES COULD INCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND OTHER PRACTICES 3 (2004), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04317t.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 8. 
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assembling the information when investor accounts are held by financial 
intermediaries, such as brokers and financial advisers.61 
While the SEC showed concern about costs, absent from its releases on 
enhanced fee disclosure is “how investors can, in light of the newly 
disclosed information, proceed to the next step . . . whether their interests 
are best served by doing some comparative shopping.”62 Without 
“processable” information that can be understood and used, the benefits of 
disclosure are wasted. As Professors Cox and Payne argue: 
Learning that your expense ratio is 1.29% is helpful but more so if this 
number can easily be placed in context. What investors wish to know is 
how this expense ratio compares with comparable investment 
opportunities. Learning that you rate a nine on a scale of ten in a 
competition is much more informative than to receive a numerical score 
when the boundaries of the scale are unknown. Thus, much like unit 
pricing information for grocery products, providing operating expense and 
return disclosures in a truly comparative framework is much more likely 
to elicit an informed choice on the part of investors than if operating 
expenses or return disclosures are made in isolation.63  
Of course, this makes sense. But the SEC (like the fund boards it 
oversees) seems more concerned with industry sensibilities than protection 
of fund investors. True regulatory reform to empower fund investors (and 
endanger industry profitability) remains off the table. 
2. Federal Judicial Oversight 
The 1940 Act does not create a comprehensive system of fiduciary 
duties and gives federal courts only narrow authority to oversee fund 
boards.64 In the one area where the 1940 Act explicitly permits fund 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See SEC Fund Expense Adopting Release, supra note 58, at 89,253 (relying on a 2000 
industry estimate that individualized disclosure would entail on-going costs of $65 million while 
the procedures adopted by the SEC would entail costs of $16 million annually).  
 62. See James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral 
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 929 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 935–36. 
 64. The 1940 Act carefully cabins federal judicial review of fund boards. Section 36(a) permits 
the SEC (but not explicitly fund investors) to bring actions challenging “a breach of fiduciary duty 
involving personal misconduct” by fund directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000). Section 36(b) 
authorizes the SEC and fund investors to sue the management firm and fund board with respect to 
compensation paid the management firm, which is deemed to have federal fiduciary duties with 
respect to the compensation. Id. § 80a-35(b). Congress, however, deftly avoided defining the 
standards of “reasonableness” for reviewing management compensation. See Cox & Payne, supra 
note 62, at 922–23 (citing INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-
184 (1969); INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 91-1382 (1970)). 
  The § 36(b) action, although procedurally a derivative suit, is not subject to a demand 
requirement. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 527 (1984). Nonetheless, it is 
burdened by a host of impediments: (1) plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial; (2) plaintiffs have 
the burden of proof, reversing the usual common law burden on self-dealing fiduciaries to prove 
fairness; (3) damages are limited to the year before the action was instituted; (4) damages are 
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investors to seek judicial review—the compensation of the fund’s 
management firm—the federal courts have refused to involve themselves in 
valuing management services and effectively shunned an oversight role.65 
Under the articulated standard, management compensation fails review 
only if it is “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable 
relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of 
arm’s-length bargaining.”66 This means that fee comparisons become 
largely irrelevant and that fund directors need not bargain for the least 
expensive investment advisory services for the fund. Fee comparisons are 
left to fund investors.67 
Federal courts reviewing allegations of excessive fees have focused on 
director qualifications and the board’s fee-setting process.68 Fund directors 
who meet the statutory standards of independence need only show they 
followed a prescribed script: frequent meetings (some without 
representatives of the management firm), fulsome information (including 
presentations, documents, and legal advice from separate counsel), and 
documentation of their efforts (negotiation position and strategy, and 
evaluation of data).69 
In a critique of federal judicial review under the 1940 Act, Professors 
Freeman and Brown point out the consistent reluctance of federal courts to 
engage in any comparative fee valuation: 
Post-Gartenberg courts have improperly denied the relevance of advisory 
fee structures actually set by arm’s-length bargaining (as in the pension 
fund advisory fee analogy). Low-cost fee structures charged by other 
funds (like Vanguard’s) are likewise found essentially irrelevant, if for no 
other reason than the fact that, because fund advisors refuse to compete 
against each other for advisory business, lower prices are not available to 
the fund. . . . The absence of a competitive market has not become a 
                                                                                                                 
limited to those resulting from the fiduciary breach, thus preventing punitive damages; and (5) 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 642. 
 65. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(eschewing comparative analysis of fund fees, but then adopting deferential “disproportionately 
large” test). 
 66. Id. 
 67. During the hearings on the 1940 Act, the Chief Counsel of the SEC testified, “There is not 
a single provision in section 15 [requiring board approval of the management firm’s advisory and 
underwriting agreements] which even remotely assumes to fix what [the management firm] should 
be paid as compensation. We feel that is a question for the stockholders to decide.” Investment 
Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. 
on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 252 (1940) (statement of David Schenker, Chief 
Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Section). 
 68. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d 875 F.2d 404 
(2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting contentions that § 36(b) of the 1940 Act requires fund directors to 
negotiate the “best deal” possible and that excessive profitability alone proves a breach of duty). 
 69. Stanley J. Friedman, The Role of Outside Directors in Negotiating Investment Company 
Advisory Agreements, 24 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 49 (1991). 
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reason for enhanced scrutiny, but a justification for fitting the judiciary 
with blinders.70 
Not surprisingly, fund boards (and their management firm sponsors) 
have a perfect record in more than twenty years of litigation challenging 
fund fees. No management firm, much less a fund director, has been 
assessed damages in a case alleging excessive fees.71 Although some cases 
have been settled, with payments coming from the management firm or 
fund-paid D&O insurance, the settlements only reinforce the prevailing 
view that fund directors are not subject to meaningful federal judicial 
oversight. The courts have declared the question of “value” to be 
intractable, and left it to the professional judgment of fund directors—and 
the marketplace.72 
Recent attempts to open other avenues of federal judicial review have 
fallen on deaf ears. Federal courts have refused to imply private actions for 
the “breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.”73 Leaving no 
doubt that the door is closed, some lower courts have explained that even if 
a private action could be implied it would not cover board nonfeasance that 
did not involve self-dealing or bad faith.74 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 651. 
 71. Id. at 642 n.116. 
 72. See Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9489, at *10, *23 n.10 
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (refusing to require disclosure, comparing fund fees, and chiding fund 
investors for not being more careful in the face of conflicts created by the management firm). 
 73. Section 36(a) of the 1940 Act authorizes the SEC to bring an enforcement action for such 
fiduciary breaches, but does not explicitly foreclose private actions. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000). 
Some courts have implied a private action under the section. See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100 
(2d Cir. 1981). More recent courts, however, have held that the section’s failure to mention private 
plaintiffs forecloses a private action. See Olmstead v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 432–36 
(2d Cir. 2002); Mutchka v. Harris, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025–27 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Davis v. 
Bailey, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38204, at *7–16 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2005) (No. 05-cv-00042-
WYD-OES). The cases reflect a jurisprudential shift in implying private actions. See Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (announcing abandonment of “ancien regime” for implying 
private actions and instructing lower federal courts to focus on statutory intent, principally as 
found in statutory text). See also Arthur Gabinet & George Gowen III, The Past and Future of 
Implied Causes of Action under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 3 VILL. J. L. & INV. MGMT. 
45, 45 (2002). 
  The refusal to imply a private action flies in the face of legislative urgings. H.R. REP. NO. 
96-1341, at 28–29 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800, 4810–11. Amending the 1940 
Act in 1980, the House Report stated, 
The Committee wishes to make plain that it expects the courts to imply private rights of 
action under this legislation, where the plaintiff falls within the class of persons 
protected by the statutory provisions in question. . . . In appropriate instances, for 
example, breaches of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct should be remedied 
under Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act.  
Id.   
 74. See Davis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38204, at *15 n.1 (stating that even if § 36(a) authorized 
private actions, it would not reach a claim for nonfeasance—namely, the failure of mutual funds to 
collect settlement moneys in securities fraud class actions—since the section only reached 
“personal misconduct”). 
182 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 1 
Federal courts asked to imply greater federal judicial oversight have 
pointed to the availability of SEC enforcement and the existing judicial 
review of advisory fees as foreclosing broader judicial intervention.75 The 
Supreme Court has given its blessing to this judicial state of affairs, 
regularly and uniformly denying review of lower court decisions that deny 
review of fund boards.76 It seems the Court believes its “watchdog” 
rhetoric. 
3. State Judicial Oversight 
State courts, responsible for enforcing state-based fiduciary duties, have 
adopted an even more deferential approach than their federal counterparts. 
Imposing a demand requirement on investor derivative suits, state courts 
have refused to even hear cases of board nonfeasance.77 Plaintiffs bear the 
nearly insuperable burden of showing that a majority of the board—and 
thus some of the independent directors—have personal conflicts that would 
prevent them from deciding a shareholder demand in good faith.78 
Otherwise, the fund board receives the benefit of the doubt under the 
business judgment rule.79 Since independent directors, by definition, do not 
have direct financial interests in management fees, the chances of 
overcoming the business judgment presumption are close to nil. Absent a 
showing of payola (beyond regular board compensation) or other corrupt 
behavior, state law effectively disavows fiduciary review of mutual fund 
activities. 
The faith generally placed in independent directors under corporate law 
rests on justifications that are inapposite to the mutual fund. In the corporate 
context, efficient capital markets price corporate governance and react to 
                                                                                                                 
  Some have pointed out the inconsistency of this cautious judicial attitude and the 1940 Act 
policy of protecting fund investors. See William K. Sjostrom, Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual 
Fund Litigation under Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 KANSAS L. REV. 
251, 278–82 (2006) (arguing for broad interpretation of “personal conduct” beyond self-dealing 
and personal impropriety, to encompass any board decision not made on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the fund). 
 75. See Gabinet & Gowen, supra note 73, at 58–59. 
 76. See, e.g., Kalish v. Franklin Advisors, Inc., 928 F.2d 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 818 (1991); Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 835 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1034 (1988); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 636 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981). 
 77. See Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123, 144 (Md. 2001) (dismissing derivative 
litigation unless plaintiff can show that “majority of the directors are so personally and directly 
conflicted or committed to the decision in dispute that they cannot reasonably be expected to 
respond to a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business judgment rule”). The 
standard is the same whether the question is demand futility or board termination of derivative 
litigation. See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1029. 
 78. Werbowsky, 766 A.2d at 144. 
 79. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming jury finding that fund trustees 
had not violated their fiduciary duties in terminating the investment advisory contract). 
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board governance failures; executive compensation is tied to stock 
performance and aligns management interests with those of shareholders; 
institutional investors can use (or threaten to use) their voting rights; and 
markets in corporate control serve as a backstop if the other mechanisms 
fail.80 Although each mechanism has shortcomings, they nonetheless have 
served to justify a judicial attitude of abstention. 
None of the justifications for judicial abstention, however, applies in 
the mutual fund context. Mutual funds do not operate in efficient markets in 
which investors price the value of fund management services. Management 
compensation is based on asset size and directors are paid in cash, thus 
compensation for neither is linked (given the dysfunctional investor market) 
to the value of the services provided. Since institutional investors purchase 
their management services independently of retail investors, they do not 
modulate pricing of retail fund services. Other intermediaries, such as 
Morningstar and the financial press, have not been effective in informing 
investors and valuing fund management services. To the contrary, they have 
exacerbated investor biases. And no control market exists for mutual funds, 
since any change of management firms would require board approval or a 
shareholder insurgency.81 
4. Professional Oversight 
Fund directors have lately been viewed as a professional corps—with 
special professional, though largely aspirational, responsibilities. The 
mutual fund industry has promoted this view. 
Proposals for fund governance reform have come from various quarters, 
most tellingly, the industry itself. For example, in 1999 an ICI advisory 
group recommended: 
1) at least two-thirds of each fund board be independent directors, and 
independent directors designate one of their own as “lead” independent 
director; 
2) former officials of the management firm or its affiliates not serve as 
independent directors, independent directors be selected and nominated by 
incumbent independent directors, independent directors complete an 
annual questionnaire on their business, financial and family relationships 
with the management firm and other service providers, and fund boards 
adopt policies on retirement of directors; 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, TRANSPARENCY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL 
MARKETS 4 (The Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable 2000), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/45/1921785.pdf.. 
 81. As Professor Langevoort points out: “Thinking about mutual funds by imagining them 
simply as a species of ‘corporations’ in a way that is directly informed by contemporary corporate 
law theory is completely misguided.” Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1032. 
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3) independent directors establish director compensation, fund directors 
invest in funds on whose boards they serve, and fund boards obtain D&O 
insurance and/or indemnification from the fund “to ensure the 
independence and effectiveness of independent directors;” 
4) independent directors meet separately from management when 
considering the fund’s advisory and underwriting contracts, and 
independent directors have qualified independent counsel and have 
express authority to consult with the fund’s independent auditors or other 
experts, as appropriate; 
5) fund boards establish an audit committee (composed entirely of 
independent directors) that would supervise the fund’s independent 
auditors; and 
6) fund directors evaluate periodically the board’s effectiveness, new fund 
directors receive appropriate orientation, and all fund directors keep 
abreast of industry and regulatory developments. 82 
Many of the “best practices” proposals, however, simply call for 
conduct that is already the industry norm.83 For example, many fund groups 
have moved on their own to increase the proportion of independent 
directors on their boards. The SEC estimates that at least 60% of fund 
boards meet the 75% independent-directors threshold.84 The shift to 
independent chairs has been even more pronounced, with 43% of fund 
boards led by an independent chair, up from less than 20% only a few years 
ago.85 
Has the director professionalism movement borne fruit? The industry 
says yes. For example, in 2005 fees were reduced on 808 mutual funds, 
while they rose on 263 funds. In comparison, fees rose on 417 funds and 
fell on 367 in 2003.86 But the net 545 funds that reduced fees in 2005 
represent less than 10% of the 8000-fund industry. 
Ultimately, gains in independent board membership and more active 
negotiation of fund fees do not change the essential dynamic of mutual fund 
governance. Fund boards can negotiate only at the margin. The threat to 
buy fund services elsewhere, always present in a real negotiation, is mostly 
empty (sometimes even ludicrous) in a negotiation of fund fees or other 
terms of the management contract. Moreover, the composition of fund 
boards with executives sympathetic to the profit motives of the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON BEST 
PRACTICES FOR FUND DIRECTORS iii–iv (1999), http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_best_practices.pdf. 
See also Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 658–59 n.200 (summarizing ICI advisory group 
recommendations). 
 83. See Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 659 n.221. 
 84. Lauricella, supra note 32, at R4 (reporting end-of-year 2004 data from the Investment 
Company Institute). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at R1 (reporting data from Lipper, Inc.). 
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management firm, cemented by the high levels of compensation for many 
fund directors, is hardly a harbinger of reform. For example, the $3 million 
in fee reductions wrangled by the AIM board in 2005 came at a not 
insignificant cost.87 In 2005, the AIM independent trustees received total 
pay, including deferred retirement benefits, of approximately $4.4 million, 
with the independent chair receiving $359,000 for his board service.88 
II. EVALUATION OF OUTSOURCING 
Has outsourcing to the mutual fund board worked? The mutual fund 
industry has argued that mutual fund boards, and the funds they supervise, 
operate in a “vigorous and highly competitive” market.89 But many outside 
the industry, including the SEC, have questioned the power of the market 
and the effectiveness of fund boards in supervising management firms—
primarily as relates to fees and costs. More recently, some have also pointed 
to the failure of the board in reining in aggressive and misguided marketing 
practices devised by management firms that prey on investor cognitive 
biases.90 
Consider the assumptions that undergird the regulatory outsourcing to 
mutual fund boards and the evidence of how that outsourcing has worked. 
A. DEBATE OVER THE FUND BOARD 
Oversight of mutual fund boards is built on certain hopeful 
assumptions. The fund industry regularly trumpets its efficiency and the 
market pressure that fund investors can wield. To the extent there are 
market inefficiencies, the SEC has sought to empower the fund board by 
reforming the rules governing fund board composition. Thus, courts 
reviewing the performance of fund boards have been inclined to use the 
same standards of deferential review applied to corporate boards, on the 
assumptions that market discipline by investors and regulatory oversight by 
the SEC make judicial intervention unnecessary. 
1. Market Efficiency 
At first glance, the mutual fund industry shows the classic hallmarks of 
market competitiveness. The supply side of the market has low barriers to 
entry and has shown great fluidity, with small funds regularly displacing 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. at R4. 
 88. See AIM INVESTMENT SECURITIES FUNDS, STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, 
APPENDIX D, TRUSTEE COMPENSATION TABLE (2006), https://www.aiminvestments.com. 
 89. How the Financial System Can Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People, 
Financial Deregulation: Hearing on H.R. 5734: The Financial Institutions Equity Act of 1984 
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1359 
(1984) (statement of David Silver, President, Investment Company Institute). 
 90. JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 164–65 (2005) (arguing that 
salesmanship triumphed over stewardship). 
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larger funds.91 The demand side is characterized by potent information and 
liquidity rights that allow fund investors easily to ascertain fund 
performance and to redeem their shares and move to better-performing or 
lower-cost funds.92 
The industry’s argument for market efficiency, repeated by some 
finance theorists, has superficial appeal.93 SEC disclosure rules arm 
investors with extensive information about fund investment policies, 
returns, management fees, and other costs.94 And for those investors 
unwilling to wade through the disclosure documents, information 
intermediaries (such as Morningstar, newsletters, financial press) provide 
“extensive coverage and analysis of mutual funds.”95 The asset-based 
compensation structure, which allows the management firm to share in 
superior investment results as the asset base increases, provides incentives 
to both attract and retain fund investors. 
The industry, until the late-trading and market-timing stories broke in 
2003, regularly trumpeted its mostly scandal-free record. By all 
appearances, portfolio securities seemed to be in safe hands and 
management firms (under the watchful eye of majority-independent boards) 
complied with the rules of the game—multitudinous and ample as they are. 
Ultimately, the proof is in the pudding. The record of mutual fund fees, 
expenses, portfolio turnover, investment strategies, fund design, and 
marketing has received a good deal of attention in the finance literature. 
The picture that emerges (described below) is not flattering for the industry. 
At almost every level, it seems that fund management firms have been 
systematically taking advantage of the informational and cognitive 
deficiencies of fund investors. Market efficiency, plausible in theory, seems 
not to have functioned in practice. 
                                                                                                                 
 91. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, STEPHEN M. GOLDFELD, LILLI A. GORDON & MICHAEL F. KOEHN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKETS: COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION 117 (Karl 
Brunner & Paul W. MacAvoy eds., 1990) (finding that under the Justice Department’s antitrust 
guidelines, mutual fund advisers compete in an unconcentrated market, with the 30 largest 
complexes experiencing a declining market share, and new smaller entrants taking market shares 
from larger rivals). 
 92. SEC, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm. 
 93. See Paula A. Tkac, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Mutual Funds: Temporary Problem 
or Permanent Morass?, 98 ECON. REV. 1, 15 (2004), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/file 
legacydocs/erq404_tkac.pdf (“The mutual fund industry is . . . no different than any other 
competitive industry. [Fund investors] exert their power via their aggregated purchasing decisions 
in a marketplace replete with choices.”). Edward B. Rock, Foxes and Hen Houses?: Personal 
Trading by Mutual Fund Managers, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1601, 1641 (1994) (“[P]roduct markets 
that are as competitive as the market for mutual funds . . . provide firms with strong incentives to 
adopt optimal personal trading policies.”). 
 94. Advertising by Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,245, 53 
Fed. Reg. 3,868 (Feb. 10, 1988). 
 95. Wang, supra note 3, at 965–66. 
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2. Structural Critique 
The SEC, on a regular basis, has questioned the structural effectiveness 
of the board and, specifically, its independent members.96 The SEC’s 
solution to the fund board’s perceived weaknesses has been to strengthen 
the board’s structural independence and authority.97 
Most recently, the SEC has proposed rules that would effectively 
require that the board be composed of 75 percent independent directors and 
that the board chair be an independent director.98 The SEC proposal, which 
has met judicial resistance, reflects the long-standing regulatory belief (even 
faith) in the ability of independent directors to serve the interests of fund 
investors unable themselves to discipline wayward or faithless fund 
management. 
Observers have long noted the structural bias inherent in the fund 
board, given the method by which non-management directors are selected 
and their professional and personal ties of directors to the management 
firm.99 
In a recent study of fees charged by mutual funds, Professors Freeman 
and Brown concluded: 
Scholarly articles published by finance academics have ridiculed board-
approved 12b-1 fees paid by fund shareholders. Law review commentators 
offer uncomplimentary evaluations of those who control fund management 
and policies. The SEC has weighed in, questioning “whether changes are 
needed in the current system.” Another federal agency, the General 
Accounting Office, recently issued a detailed report finding that mutual 
funds generally do not attempt to compete on the basis of costs (i.e., price 
competition is muted). . . . [D]ecades of SEC-commissioned studies, rule-
making, and jawboning have led to a system that, for the most part, works 
                                                                                                                 
 96. SEC Staff Report Protecting Investors, supra note 25, at 266 (examining existing 
governance model to increase board effectiveness, and concluding that board governance is 
“fundamentally sound”). 
 97. See SEC REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, 
H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 (1966) (finding inadequate the independence standard under the 1940 Act, 
since independent directors are often close to the adviser through business or family 
relationships). In response, Congress amended the 1940 Act in 1970 to tighten the standards of 
independence and to permit fund investors to seek judicial review of management compensation. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(19) (West 2006) (defining “interested person”); Id. § 80a-35(b) (providing 
a private action to remedy fiduciary breaches involving fees paid management firm). 
 98. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 83 SEC 
Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004). Curiously, the SEC has stated that its rule mandating an independent 
board chair was not adopted “as a means of enhancing fund financial performance or reducing 
fund expenses.” SEC Staff Report on Independent Chair, supra note 27, at 2. Instead, the change 
was said to improve compliance and ensure fund boards focus on the long-term interests of fund 
investors. Id. One is left to wonder why improved compliance and an investor focus should not 
produce financial results. 
 99. See Brudney, supra note 45, at 612. 
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beautifully for those who sell funds to the public, or sell services to funds, 
but much less admirably for the industry’s investors.100 
In the end, fund directors may perceive their role as supercilious. Fund 
investors receive disclosure, have available comparative information, and 
can move their mutual fund investments as they choose. On the assumption 
of consumer sovereignty, the board is at most a bureaucratic compliance 
office. 
3. Doctrinal Critique 
More recently, academic commentators have identified the doctrinal 
deference to fund boards, even when composed by a majority of 
independent directors.101 They have criticized the judicial approach of 
federal courts (which defer to state law on questions of board demand and 
termination of investor suits) and state courts (which defer to independent 
directors under the business judgment rule). 
The transliteration of traditional corporate governance norms to the 
mutual fund context is simplistic—and misplaced. Unlike their counterparts 
in operating companies, fund directors are not subject to the threat of 
shareholder insurgencies or takeover pressures; they lack the realistic power 
to replace fund management; and they generally rely on the management 
firm for information, direction, and compensation. And the linking of 
compensation to performance—as with stock-based compensation in 
operating companies or performance-based compensation in hedge funds—
is diluted by the asset-based compensation in mutual funds. 
The doctrinal gap, rather than narrowing, has been widening. Recently, 
courts have largely sidestepped the wave of investor litigation arising from 
the spate of late-trading and marketing-timing scandals. Federal courts have 
refused to imply federal fiduciary duties, and state courts have refused to 
relieve investors of the board demand and termination procedures of state 
corporate law.102 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Freeman & Brown. supra note 52, at 611–13 (citations omitted). 
 101. See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1017–18. 
 102. Federal judicial abstention in this area is not new. In a line of Supreme Court cases on 
whether fund boards are bound by federal law or state law, the resounding answer has been in 
favor of state law. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 472 (1979) (finding that state law governs 
termination of derivative suit, unless inconsistent with policies of 1940 Act); see generally Kamen 
v. Kemper Fin. Servs. Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (finding that state law controls question of board 
demand). Only when there is clear federal policy, such as the express private action under § 36(b) 
to overcome the perceived inability of independent directors to control overreaching management, 
does federal law control. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 527 (1984) (finding no 
demand requirement under § 36(b)). 
  Even if the federal courts were to expand their currently cabined view of implied private 
actions under the 1940 Act, fund investors would face the daunting challenge of bringing 
derivative claims in the face of board demand and dismissal tools available under state law—
primarily, Delaware and Maryland where most mutual funds are organized. See Scalisi v. Fund 
Asset Management L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying Maryland’s approach that 
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Summarizing the sad state of the fund board, Professor Wang in a 
comprehensive article on the board-centric structure of U.S. mutual funds 
concluded: 
To evaluate the institutional competence of the board, it is essential to 
inquire into the board’s independence and informational advantage. . . . 
Because directors are not truly independent, they are vulnerable to 
coalition politics. In addition, because directors have a limited 
informational advantage over investors, it may not be realistic to expect 
them to strike the best deals for investors. In this respect, traditional 
monitoring devices such as fiduciary duties and incentive-compatible 
contracts are not effective devices to discipline the performance of the 
board.103  
B. EMPIRICAL DATA ON MUTUAL FUND MARKETS 
How has the mutual fund market performed? Rather than consider the 
structural and doctrinal effectiveness of the fund board, the more relevant 
question is how fund directors have measurably fulfilled their role as 
“watchdogs” for fund investors. Viewing fund governance as a black box, 
the question is how well fund boards have performed their functions. 
Even if fund governance (the supply market) is not working, it is 
possible that fund investors (the demand market) have exercised their 
informational and liquidity rights to protect themselves. Again, the question 
is whether fund investors have exercised their buy/sell rights to demand 
good performance at low cost. The rich finance literature on the functioning 
of the mutual fund markets over the past several years provides some 
answers. The studies reveal a largely dysfunctional supply market with fund 
boards performing poorly nearly all the tasks assigned to them.104 The same 
is true for the demand market, where fund investors by and large possess 
neither the information nor acumen to protect themselves. Although some 
recent data suggest greater consumerism among fund investors, the change 
appears to be at the margin. 
1. Board Performance 
Academic studies tell a consistent and disturbing story of the failure of 
fund boards to negotiate lower fees in the face of economies of scale 
generated by rising fund assets and enhanced computer and tele-
                                                                                                                 
demand and termination by independent directors is subject to review under the business judgment 
rule). 
 103. Wang, supra note 3, at 1008. 
 104. To date, no studies look at the performance of fund boards in supervising late-trading and 
market-timing practices. The brazen nature of the practices in some fund families raises questions 
about the effectiveness of fund boards at this, their most basic, task. Nonetheless, whether because 
of board pressure or management firm response to the SEC’s and Attorney Elliot Spitzer’s 
enforcement actions, there is reason to believe the industry has responded to ameliorate the 
practices. 
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communications technologies. After reviewing some of the academic 
literature, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that fund 
boards “may be keeping fees at higher levels because of [a] focus on 
maintaining fees within the range of other funds.”105 
Fund boards have also failed investors in the supervision and approval 
of marketing by management firms. The studies surveyed by the GAO 
found that “the information currently provided does not sufficiently make 
investors aware of the level of fees they pay.”106 As one study concluded, 
perhaps kindly, “funds do not compete primarily on the basis of their 
operating expense fees.”107 Instead, funds seem to compete on the basis of 
marketing—with advertisement focused on recent performance results. 
Board hiring/retention of management firm 
• Business connections between fund directors and advisory firms affect 
hiring, compensation, and performance. Fund boards preferentially hire 
advisory firms having more business relationships with fund directors. 
Fund advisors receive higher pay when more connected to the fund 
directors. Preferential hiring and pay is not compensated by higher 
performance. In fact, greater connections correspond to a decrease in 
fund return, before and after advisory fees, of about 1% per year.108 
Board negotiation of advisory contracts and fees 
• Expense ratios have risen, even as fund assets have grown and fund 
management has become more efficient. Weighted average expense 
ratios for all mutual funds (stock and bond funds) rose from 0.73% in 
1979 to 0.94% in 1999—a nearly 30% increase.109 Weighted average 
expense ratios for equity funds grew from 0.64% in 1980 to 0.92% in 
2004—an increase of more than 40%—even as equity fund assets rose 
from $45 billion to $4,034 billion.110 
• Negotiation of advisory contracts appears to be perfunctory. 
Contractual renegotiations are “rare event[s]” that happen in only 10% 
                                                                                                                 
 105. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES: ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE COULD 
ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION 8, 47 (2000) [hereinafter GAO Mutual Fund Disclosure Report] 
(noting that some studies “found that fees had been rising”). 
 106. Id. at 7, 76 (“[A]cademic researchers [and others] saw problems with the fee disclosures” 
by mutual funds). 
 107. Id. at 62. 
 108. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the 
Mutual Fund Industry 6 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=849705 [hereinafter Kuhnen, Social Networks]. 
 109. SEC Division of Investment Management: Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses 20 
Table 2 (2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm. The report determined that the 
increase in average expense ratios was primarily due to greater use of 12b-1 fees to pay for fund 
distribution costs. Id. at 21. 
 110. BOGLE, supra note 90, at 155 Box 7.2 (finding that unweighted expense ratios have risen 
even faster than weighted expense ratios, from 0.94% in 1980 to 1.56% in 2004). 
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of funds.111 When they do happen, they produce lower fees for bottom 
and mid-performing funds that correlate to later positive performance, 
as well as net inflows. It is “puzzling” that fund boards do not actively 
renegotiate advisory contracts, given the apparent benefits.112 
• Fund boards accept higher expense ratios for high-performance 
funds.113 Although overall management fees decline somewhat as fund 
size increases, administrative costs decline more rapidly. That is, 
advisory fees constitute a profit center for management firms.114 
• Advisory fees charged mutual funds are not competitive with advisory 
fees charged pension funds. Advisory fee ratios for public pension 
clients are roughly half of that for comparable actively managed equity 
mutual funds—even though the average such mutual fund has assets 
that are nearly three times larger than the average pension portfolio.115 
On a size-standardized basis, the average actively managed mutual fund 
pays advisory fees of 0.67%, compared to 0.28% paid by pension 
portfolios.116 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Dynamic Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry 8–9 (Unpublished 
Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687530. 
 112. Kuhnen, Social Networks, supra note 108, at 1 (discussing a study of negotiations of 
advisory contracts from 1994–2002). 
 113. Jerold B. Warner & Joanna Shuang Wu, Changes in Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts 2 
(Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, Working Paper No. FR 05-14, 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=841565 (“[H]igh asset growth increases the likelihood of a contract 
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fourth, with fee increases and decreases roughly equally likely.” Id. “[F]unds with superior 
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scale associated with growth.” Id. at 6, 2. 
 114. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 625 (using a sample of 2161 funds in 1999, with a 
total market value of $2.2 trillion, finding that “advisory and administrative costs decline as fund 
size increases, but with administrative costs declining much more rapidly”). The authors 
calculated that if advisory costs had declined by the same percentage as administrative costs, 
average advisory fees for funds with assets above $5 billion would have been 28 basis points, 
rather than 46 basis points. Thus, assuming equal economies of scale for advisory fees and 
administrative fees, the larger funds charge excess advisory fees of about $2.5 billion annually. Id. 
 115. Management firms charge retail mutual funds “systematically higher” advisory fees than 
they charge their pension fund clients, for essentially the same service. Freeman & Brown, supra 
note 52, at 628, 630–32 (analyzing fee data collected in 1999 from 36 public pension funds that 
had placed 220 equity portfolios under active management with outside investment advisers, 
representing $97.5 billion in assets, finding that comparable mutual funds pay about twice as 
much as the pension fund clients, with the difference more pronounced as the fund/portfolio size 
increases). The disparity has existed over time. A Wharton study conducted in 1962, looking at a 
sample of 54 management firms with both mutual fund clients and other clients, found that fee 
rates charged mutual funds were at least 50% higher in 39 out of the 54 cases, 200% higher in 24 
of the cases, and 500% or more higher in 9 of the cases. WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE & 
COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. NO. 2274-87, at 489–94 (1962). 
 116. Freeman & Brown, supra note 52, at 633. The findings are dramatic for large-
capitalization funds, where mutual funds pay weighted average advisory fees of 52 basis points, 
compared to 21 basis points for comparable pension fund portfolios. The fee differential is further 
exacerbated in view of average fund size, with the average large-cap mutual fund ($2 billion) 
almost four times larger than the average pension fund portfolio ($555 million). Id. at 635. That is, 
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• Higher advisory fees do not buy better performance. High-fee funds 
under-perform low-fee funds—even before factoring in fees. Advisory 
fee levels, generally a percentage of fund total net assets, increase as a 
result of recent superior fund performance.117 
• Actively managed mutual funds are more expensive than they appear. 
Most actively managed funds engage in shadow indexing, while 
charging fund investors for active management. On average, most of 
the variance between the fund’s stated active managed assets and the 
fund’s actual shadow indexed assets is explained by the fund’s 
benchmark index.118 Separating active assets from passive assets, the 
mean expense ratio for the active portion of the portfolio of actively-
managed large-cap equity mutual funds of “5.14% runs more than 
500% higher than the published expense ratio of 0.77%.”119 
Board approval of loads 
• Nearly two-thirds of equity funds impose distribution fees, as load 
charges paid directly by fund investors or as annual marketing fees paid 
pursuant to Rule 12b-1. The true cost of distribution fees to investors is 
hard to measure because “fund companies have developed distribution 
arrangements that differ in both the magnitude and timing of fees 
paid.”120 
• While 12b-1 fees (paid from fund assets) increase the fund’s market 
share, there is “no evidence” current or new investors derive any benefit 
from 12b-1 fees.121 Funds with 12b-1 fees have higher expense ratios 
and are more likely to fail. Fund investors pay for additional marketing, 
but garner no additional investment returns—a “dead weight cost.”122 
                                                                                                                 
management firms charge the average large cap mutual fund $10.4 million, while they charge the 
average pension fund portfolio $1.2 million—for essentially the same service. 
 117. Warner & Wu, supra note 113, at 26–27. Also finding that advisory fee rates decrease 
when economies of scale exist and they are associated with growth. Id. at 6. 
 118. Ross M. Miller, Measuring the True Cost of Active Management by Mutual Funds 11 
(Unpublished Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=746926. 
 119. Id. at 12. 
 120. Miles Livingston & Edward S. O’Neal, The Cost of Mutual Fund Distribution Fees, 21 J. 
FIN. RES. 205, 206 (1998). The study produced a “simple methodology” that expresses “present 
value of distribution costs as fraction of original investment for multiple-class fees” during any 
potential holding period, allowing direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees 
for different sales arrangements. Id. at 214. 
 121. Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the Mutual Fund 
Industry 1–2 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240596 
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number of active funds tripled, and the market share of each fund declined). 
 122. Stephen P. Ferris & Don M. Chance, The Effect of 12b-1 Plans on Mutual Fund Expense 
Ratios: A Note, 42 J. FIN. 1077, 1082 (1987) (describing 12b-1 fees as “a dead-weight cost”); 
Robert W. McLeod & D.K. Malhotra, A Re-examination of the Effect of 12b-1 Plans on Mutual 
Fund Expense Ratios, 72 J. FIN. RES. 231, 239 (1994) (stating that 12b-1 fees are “a dead weight 
cost” to fund investors that has been increasing over time); Antonio Apap & John M. Griffith, The 
Impact of Expenses on Mutual Fund Performance, 11 J. FIN. PLAN. 76, 80 (1998) (concluding that 
for variety of equity funds, 12b-1 fees do not add to funds’ performance). 
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• The number of funds with 12b-1 fees is growing, as is the level of 12b-
1 fees.123 Increasingly, 12b-1 fees are charged in funds closed to new 
investors, “almost all of which are load funds.”124 
• Load funds, which directly charge investors for marketing expenses, do 
not out-perform no-load funds. Even before adjusting for loads in 
returns, no-load funds beat their load counterparts. When loads are 
figured in, no-load funds perform much better than load funds. And 
comparing load funds, there is no significant difference in performance 
between high-load funds and low-load funds even after adjusting for 
loads.125 
• Load funds target less-knowledgeable investors and charge higher 
expenses. The average annual expense ratio of load equity funds has 
widened since the early 1990s and by 2000–2004 was 50 basis points 
higher than no-load equity funds.126 
• In the 1990s, most funds with front-end loads added new share classes, 
which allowed investors instead to pay annual fees and/or back-end 
charges. Multiple-class funds attracted shorter-horizon investors, 
resulting in an increase in fund volatility and a significant drop in fund 
performance.127 
• Expensive load funds, without minimum-balance requirements, are 
targeted at investors in less affluent, less educated, and ethnic minority 
neighborhoods—a kind of “predatory” money management.128 
Board supervision of fund marketing 
• Fund investors who purchase through brokers or financial advisors pay 
“unjustified” higher costs. Broker customers are often directed to hard-
to-find funds, which charge substantially higher fees and provide lower 
risk-adjusted returns than directly placed funds. “[B]roker-channel 
funds exhibit no superior asset allocation. . . . While we cannot seem to 
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 125. Matthew R. Morey, Should You Carry the Load? A Comprehensive Analysis of Load and 
No-Load Mutual Fund Out-of-Sample Performance, 27 J. BANKING FIN. 1245 (2003) (using 
sample of funds free of survivorship bias, evaluating performance across different performance 
metrics and different ages and styles of funds; finding differences to be statistically significant at 
one percent level across different performance metrics). 
 126. Houge & Wellman, supra note 124, at 3. 
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Experiment on Fund Flows and Performance 3 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2003), available at 
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locate tangible benefits delivered by brokers, we remain open to the 
possibility that substantial intangible benefits exist.” 129 
• Fund families create the illusion of high-rated funds by merging low-
performing funds into high-performing funds—marketing the 
survivor’s healthy past performance. Funds disappear at a rate of 
approximately 3.6% a year primarily because of multi-year poor 
performance.130 The resulting “survivor bias” results in overstatement 
of fund family performance, by air-painting out below-average funds 
from the family portrait.131 
• Fund boards rarely close funds to new investors, even when the fund 
has reached an optimal size. For actively managed funds, returns (both 
before and after fees and expenses) decline with lagged fund size. The 
relationship is most pronounced in funds that invest in small and 
illiquid stocks, where scale adversely affects liquidity.132 
• Funds with front-end loads have recently introduced additional share 
classes, “allowing investors to replace front-end loads with higher 
annual fees and/or back-end charges.”133 While increasing fund cash 
flows by attracting shorter-horizon investors, the result has been a 
significant drop in fund performance. In fact, fund performance drops 
and volatility rises as funds increase the proportion of short-horizon 
investors.134 
Board supervision of fund investment strategies 
• Morningstar ratings, on which fund investors irrationally rely, skew the 
behavior of fund managers. Funds that achieve high ratings tend to 
increase their risk levels, resulting in a “significant fall off” in 
performance as managers are unable to “load on momentum stock” 
after the fund receives the initial five-star rating.135 
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Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry 36 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2006), 
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 130. Mark M. Carhart, Jennifer N. Carpenter, Anthony W. Lynch & David K. Musto, Mutual 
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 131. Id. at 1439. 
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at 1293. 
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 134. Id. at 22. 
 135. Matthew R. Morey, The Kiss of Death: A 5-Star Morningstar Mutual Fund Rating, 3 J. 
INV. MGMT. 41 (2005) (examining effect 5-star Morningstar mutual fund rating has on fund 
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• Fund managers adapt their investment strategy in the last part of a 
calendar year according to their performance in the first part, in 
particular taking greater risk to keep a high Morningstar rating from the 
beginning of the year.136 
• Annual trading costs for equity funds average 0.78% of fund assets. 
Trading costs are negatively related to fund returns, and there is no 
evidence that average trading costs are recovered in higher overall fund 
returns. Trading appears to have a greater drag on fund returns than 
turnover.137 
• Fund over-trading often occurs because of the presence of short-term 
investors in long-term funds. Fund managers can use observable 
investor characteristics to predict investment horizons when investors 
open an account. The pooling in the same fund of long-term investors 
and short-term investors costs long-term investors 0.51% in foregone 
annual returns.138 
• Larger fund families aggressively market their “winning” funds (the 
previous year’s best performers) and allocate extra manager resources 
to these funds.139 In fact, an investment strategy that purchases a fund 
family’s past-year winners and shorts its past-year losers produces 
abnormal positive returns. The strategy is particularly successful in 
larger fund families, suggesting the latitude of larger families to allocate 
resources unevenly between funds.140 
• Fund families strategically allocate performance across member funds 
to favor those more likely to generate future inflows and higher fee 
income. Strategic cross-fund subsidization of “high” funds at the 
expense of “low” funds is between 6 to 28 basis points of extra net-of-
style performance per month.141 This preferential allocation occurs with 
respect to IPO deals and opposite trades (sometimes actual cross-
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 139. See Donald W. Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 228 
(1970) (finding investors are more concerned with the relative performance of aggressive mutual 
funds). 
 140. Ilan Guedj & Jannette Papastaikoudi, Can Mutual Fund Families Affect the Performance 
of Their Funds? 24 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
467282 (study of funds in large fund families). 
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Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73, 102 (2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=557078. 
196 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 1 
trading) among “high” and “low value” funds in the same fund 
complex.142 
• Fund boards with a greater proportion of independent directors seem to 
supervise the management firm more diligently than low-proportion 
funds. Fund performance and the likelihood of replacing under-
performing fund managers increases as the proportion of independent 
directors increases.143 
2. Empirical Data on Investor/Market Effectiveness 
Not only does the finance literature raise doubts about fund governance, 
it also reveals the investor market to be informationally inefficient—the 
same finding that motivated the 1940 Act and its outsourcing of fund 
supervision to the fund board.144 Recent studies show fund investors 
continue to lack the investment acumen, relevant information, and ability to 
protect their own interests.145 The notion, powerful in theory, that mutual 
fund investors can discipline wayward management firms by exercising 
their easy “entry/exit” rights has proved mostly empty in practice. Study 
after study makes clear that most fund investors are unable to fend for 
themselves.146 
Investor response to fund fees  
• Investors are often ignorant of expenses charged by their funds. 
According to a survey of fund investors, fewer than 20% could estimate 
expenses for the largest fund they held.147 Even sophisticated fund 
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 143. Bill Ding & Russ R. Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance and Governance Structure: The 
Role of Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors 4 (Unpublished Working Paper, 2005), 
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 144. From the beginning, it has been understood that disclosure to investors is not enough. As 
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investors lack a good understanding of the historical returns of their 
fund investments.148 
• Investors are often unaware that higher fund expenses are a drag on 
fund performance. In one survey, about 20% of surveyed investors 
believed that high-fee funds produced better results; more than 60% 
believed funds with higher expenses produced average results; and 
fewer than 16% believed higher expenses led to lower than average 
returns.149 In another survey, 84% of respondents believed that higher 
fund expenses correlate with higher fund performance.150 
• Fund investors are relatively insensitive to advisory fees, paying some 
attention when they buy, but not as they hold. Funds that reduce their 
fees gain market share, but only if their fees were above average to 
start. Low-cost funds do not lose market share by charging higher 
fees.151 
• Fund investors have become more sensitive to front-end loads and 
commissions, but remain insensitive to operating expenses. Over the 
last 30 years, front-end loads (as well as commissions charged by 
brokerage firms) have had a consistently negative relation to fund 
flows.152 There is no relation (or even a perverse positive relation) 
between operating expenses and fund flows. Investors purchase “funds 
that attract their attention through advertising and distri-
bution. . . . mutual fund advertising works.”153 
• In relatively homogenous fund sectors, such as S&P index funds, 
investors find it difficult to identify bargains. Investors tend to go with 
recognized “name brands” based on fund age and family size, with a 
marked shift in sector assets to more expensive (often new entry) 
funds.154 
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Investor response to market changes 
• Fund investors over-trade. In turn, investor short-termism drives the 
short investment horizons of fund managers, not the other way 
around.155 
• Fund investors systematically engage in a “buy high, sell low” trading 
strategy. Monthly data from 1984-2003 show a negative relationship 
between aggregate net flows into and out of the funds and the returns of 
the funds in subsequent periods.156 As a result, fund investors realize 
lower long-term accumulated return than the “long-term accumulated 
return on a ‘buy and hold’ position in these funds.”157 
• Fund investors over-react to market volatility—the “grass is greener” 
phenomenon. Stock fund investors withdraw assets in response to 
market volatility—both concurrently and based on past semi-annual and 
annual volatility.158 Fund investors over-react both to downside 
volatility and upside volatility. Stock fund flows, in turn, contribute to 
market volatility—as “noisy traders” destabilize the overall stock 
market.159 
• Fund investors follow the crowd. Net aggregate equity fund flows 
typically track general investor sentiment. Moreover, there is a self-
reinforcing aspect to investor sentiment as higher equity fund flows 
induce newsletter writers to become more bullish.160 
Investor response to past performance 
• Fund investors respond to the heuristic “past is prologue.”161 Past 
performance is at best a weak predictor for anticipating fund 
performance. While one-star and two-star Morningstar ratings generally 
predict relatively poor future performance, Morningstar’s five-star 
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funds generally do not outperform four-star and three-star funds.162 In 
fact, a 5-star Morningstar rating may be a “kiss of death.”163 Three 
years after a fund receives its initial 5-star rating, fund performance 
severely falls off across different performance measures and different 
samples of funds.164 
• Fund directors, contrary to anecdotal evidence, often hold shares in the 
funds they oversee.165 But there is evidence that directors chase perfor-
mance in their ownership choices, just like other fund investors.166 
• The “past is prologue” mentality extends to the financial press. Fund 
rankings by the leading financial publications (Barron’s, Business 
Week, and Forbes) based on past performance do not predict superior 
future performance.167 Most ranked funds (65%) have lower perfor-
mance in the post-ranking period compared to the pre-ranking period.168 
Investor response to scandals 
• Response by fund investors to mutual fund scandals has been mixed. 
Funds affected by scandals experience significantly greater outflow of 
assets, with the outflow greater the more severe the scandal (as 
measured by size of regulatory settlement/fine, press coverage, and 
filing of formal charges). Outflows are greater where the scandal 
involved a penalized entity, as opposed to individual wrongdoers no 
longer associated with the fund. But fund scandals first discovered by 
the SEC do not result in significant outflows. Lastly, strengthened 
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corporate governance controls have no impact on the amount of 
outflows from a scandal fund.169 
C. EVALUATION OF DATA 
The data paint a dismal picture of fund board performance. Fund boards 
have failed in their function to negotiate management fees. In fact, the 
recent slowing growth of weighted average fees (compared to the 
continuing growth in unweighted average fees) highlights the inability of 
fund boards to lower fees, even as some fund investors have moved to 
lower-cost funds. That is, fund boards have been less effective in lowering 
fund fees than fund investors. Even worse than their performance on 
negotiating management fees, fund boards have achieved nothing for their 
investors by approving loads—especially 12b-1 fees. 
The data tell an equally sad story about fund investors. Fund investors 
are often ignorant of fund expenses and unaware of their relation to 
performance. They suffer from cognitive biases, for example that “past is 
prologue”—a belief they share with the financial press and even fund 
managers. Fund design and marketing pander to this belief and over-
emphasize high Morningstar ratings, which studies show represent a 
statistical guarantee the fund will regress to the mean. Many fund investors 
shun index funds, even though they are a proven long-term investment 
vehicle. Instead, they engage in pathological “buy high, sell low” trading 
strategies that over-optimistically aim to out-perform the market. Fund 
managers mirror (or induce) a “grass is greener” bias in their over-trading 
of portfolio assets and widespread belief that they too can beat the market. 
Not everyone can be above average. 
Even those studies that suggest independent directors provide some 
value—that is, that fund performance and the likelihood of replacing under-
performing fund managers increases as the proportion of independent 
directors rises—do not establish a causal relationship between board 
independence and fund results. Instead, it seems more likely that investor-
friendly management firms (i.e., those that adopt strategies of low fees, 
long-term investment policies, responsiveness to failed investment 
strategies, and investor-appropriate marketing) are more likely to have truly 
independent directors advising on these matters. In fact, the studies that 
suggest funds with independent chairs out-perform their management-
chaired counterparts lead only to the conclusion that management firms 
focused on their own profits under-perform firms with an investor focus.170 
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III. OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Can the fund board be rehabilitated? The mutual fund industry has 
strong reasons to resist having the board structure dismantled. Outsourcing 
of regulatory supervision to an internal monitor gives the industry great 
freedom—particularly when compared to the alternative of external 
regulation.171 In areas of fund management subject to board oversight, 
management firms have the discretion to test the limits of the market. 
Not surprisingly, there is no impetus for fundamental reform. The 
mutual fund industry is quite pleased with the fund board and the results it 
has produced. Fund directors, without questioning their own value, have 
supported calls for greater independence and greater role clarity. The SEC 
willingly parrots the mantra that the fund board is an essential component 
of fund regulation, particularly since the job falls outside the agency. 
Perhaps the only mutual fund constituents that might have reservations 
about the fund board—fund investors—are mostly unaware that there is a 
fund board or that it has failed them. 
After surveying the data on the higher investment advisory fees charged 
mutual funds compared to pension plans, Professors Freeman and Brown 
concluded: 
The fund industry is over-regulated and under-policed. The absence of a 
strong corrective influence should not be surprising. Those in control of an 
industry boasting over $7 trillion in liquid assets can afford superb 
lawyers, lobbyists, and public relations specialists. . . . Congress has not 
shown interest in improving investors’ remedies and cannot be counted on 
to alter the way the fund industry chooses to conduct itself. The SEC 
generally has contented itself with presenting proposals destined to have 
little impact on the way most mutual funds do business.172 
To the extent that some mutual funds have shown a “reform 
mentality”—lowering management fees, offering life-cycle funds intended 
to encourage proven long-term investment strategies, and cautioning 
investors against over-trading—the new attitudes seem driven more by 
greater investor sophistication than by awakened fund boards. The industry 
recognizes the scandal-induced skepticism about its product and has every 
reason to show that its house is in order and that the current regulatory 
structure is adequate. 
But given the long-standing failure of the fund board and the continuing 
inability of investors to discipline industry excess, the time is ripe for a 
fundamental re-appraisal of the fund board. 
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A. ALTERNATIVES TO BOARD-CENTRIC STRUCTURES 
The recent mutual fund scandals and a slowing stock market have led 
many to question the efficacy of the fund board. Reform proposals, most of 
which seek to create additional structures to compensate for the board’s 
failure, have become a cottage industry. 
Consider some recent proposals: 
New SRO. Some reformers have proposed a new self-regulatory organ-
ization to oversee mutual funds, thus augmenting fund boards and taking 
pressure off limited SEC resources. Rather than the current reliance on 
internal mechanisms, the SRO could engage in more focused rule making, 
with the SEC (and state attorneys general) using their enforcement powers 
as a “residual mechanism.”173 
New oversight board. Others have suggested a Mutual Fund Oversight 
Board, modeled on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
which would be responsible for (and only for) establishing uniform 
minimum standards for fund governance. The new board would perform an 
investigative and rule-making function, providing the flexibility that the 
SEC lacks to keep standards current.174 
New “expert” directors. Others would seek to make the fund board 
more independent and qualified by mandating that the board include a 
certified financial analyst (CFA)175—much like the Sarbanes-Oxley 
requirement of a financial expert on the audit committee of public 
companies.176 The CFA would presumably be better able to recognize 
excessive fund fees.177 
Invigorate mutual fund litigation. Others would call on courts to 
make derivative litigation a “serviceable mechanism for serious judicial 
review in cases of fiduciary breach.”178 Given the deficiencies of investor 
market oversight, courts should look at the merits of fund over-pricing. 
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More investor-usable disclosure. Others have urged the SEC to 
mandate greater disclosure of fund expenses—as is required in other 
financial service industries and consumer markets. Some would require 
individualized disclosure in account statements that show actual fund 
expenses, with a break down of fees and other expenses.179 Some would 
require that the statements also include how the actual expenses compared 
with industry ranges and averages.180 
But others—mostly practicing lawyers—doubt whether the board can 
be salvaged. Some assert that the SEC’s initiatives to buttress board 
independence are of “questionable efficacy” and implicitly conclude that 
the board cannot fulfill its watchdog function.181 A few have called for the 
fund board to be eliminated, describing it as “paraphernalia.”182 As one 
reform proponent pointed out a fund without directors would not make “an 
awful lot of difference and would be cheaper to operate.”183 
Even the SEC has imagined mutual funds without directors. In a 1992 
study the SEC staff considered a board-less fund structure, called a unitary 
investment fund (UIF), as part a comprehensive review of existing fund 
governance.184 The concept was a mutual fund that would be treated as a 
proprietary financial product sold by a sponsor and governed by the terms 
of a trust indenture. As proposed, the UIF would have a corporate trustee 
(the sponsor/management firm) that would sell interests in the trust to 
investors. The trust indenture would spell out fundamental investment 
policies and the management fee, and could be changed only with some 
difficulty. A single management fee would cover all fund-related expenses 
and would be subject to a statutory maximum. The UIF would have no 
board of directors or shareholder voting, nor would there be judicial review 
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of fund fees. The 1940 Act prohibitions against self-dealing transactions 
would apply, without exception.185 
Ultimately, the staff rejected the UIF concept as not offering an 
adequate substitute for board review of fees and other fund operations. The 
SEC staff seemed unwilling to imagine a model without an independent 
monitor. Instead, the staff concluded that the board-centric governance 
structure is fundamentally “sound” and should be retained.186 
But the idea of a board-less mutual fund is not far-fetched. In fact, the 
fastest-growing mutual funds in the United States—private hedge funds and 
some exchange traded funds organized as unit trusts—do not have board 
structures.187 Like registered mutual funds, these financial intermediaries 
pool money that investors entrust to professional managers to make 
investments on their behalf. Fee setting is a matter of contract, and 
regulatory compliance is an internal responsibility of the management firm. 
Even though hedge funds are subject to nearly identical internal 
conflicts as registered mutual funds, the idea of a fund board to ensure 
hedge fund compliance and to regulate management activities were not 
even considered in the recent SEC rule-making to require hedge fund 
registration.188 Instead, the SEC rules (which were recently invalidated) 
would have required that hedge funds registered with the SEC have a 
compliance officer.189 The compliance officer, unlike the mutual fund 
board, would have no authority to validate self-interested activities of the 
fund manager. The compliance officer—whose functions were to parallel 
those performed by in-house legal departments and compliance offices in 
brokerage firms, banks and insurance companies—would have simply been 
charged with establishing control systems to ensure legal compliance. 
The SEC explained the compliance officer’s function in much the same 
terms as it has described the mutual fund board: 
Hedge fund advisers . . . must develop and implement a compliance 
infrastructure. . . . Our examination staff resources are limited, and we 
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cannot be at the office of every adviser at all times. Compliance officers 
serve as the front line watch for violations of securities laws, and provide 
protection against conflicts of interests.190 
For hedge funds, external regulatory oversight ultimately resides with 
the SEC under its powers to regulate securities fraud and the fiduciary 
responsibilities of investment advisers under federal and state law, as well 
as with investors through contractual protections and their ability to “enter” 
and “exit” the fund. 
B. MUTUAL FUND STRUCTURES OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Mutual fund boards are largely a U.S. phenomenon. Most other 
countries treat mutual funds as an investment “product” offered by 
investment management firms. The regulatory focus elsewhere is on the 
management firm, not the investment pool or its legal supervisor. 
Regulation of product terms (fees and management services), custodial 
responsibilities, and fund marketing is a matter of government agency 
supervision, with residual oversight by self-regulatory organizations and 
courts under a regime of fiduciary duties that fall on the management firm. 
Consider the regulation of mutual funds in Germany, Japan and Britain. 
In Germany mutual funds are not separate entities, but instead segregated 
asset pools managed by an investment management firm that is regulated by 
the German Federal Banking Commission (BAKred).191 Investors enter into 
a contract with the management firm and acquire participatory units in the 
segregated assets, with the management firm obligated to repurchase the 
units if redeemed by the investor. The assets must be kept with a custodian 
bank, which is obligated to supervise the management firm on behalf of 
fund investors. Thus, protection of fund investors in Germany is primarily 
the responsibility of the management firm, which has a statutory duty to act 
in the interests of fund investors. The management firm, in turn, is 
supervised by the custodian bank and the BAKred, both of which may bring 
suit against the management firm for failures to act. The BAKred may 
dismiss a fund manager who is unfit professionally or who violates the 
mutual fund rules. 
In Japan mutual funds exist as investment trusts, with a trustee that 
must be a trust company or bank.192 The trustee enters into a “contract of 
trust” with an investment trust management company, which must be 
licensed and is subject to statutory standards. The management company 
gives advice with respect to trust assets and has fiduciary duties in relation 
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to the assets, though not necessarily to fund investors. The trustee keeps 
custody and administers the trust assets. Fund investors have beneficial 
interests in the trust. The Ministry of Finance regulates the trustee, as well 
as the terms of the trust contract entered into with the management 
company. The management company is subject to the rules of a self-
regulatory group, the Investment Trust Association. 
In Britain mutual funds are unit trusts, constituted under trust law.193 
The trustee contracts with a manager (a firm or individual) that manages the 
trust assets, though the trustee retains custody and control of the assets. The 
trustee oversees the manager, though the manager typically appoints the 
trustee. To qualify as an authorized unit trust, the trust must comply with 
detailed regulations that cover its constitution, the power and duties of the 
trustee and manager, investment and borrowing powers, and pricing and 
valuation. The trustee and manager are both subject to regulation by self-
regulating organizations. Government oversight comes from the 
Department of Trade and Industry, which has delegated most of its powers 
to the non-governmental Securities and Investment Board. 
In addition, since 1997 mutual funds in the United Kingdom can be 
operated as open-ended investment companies (OEICs), which can be 
marketed elsewhere in the European Union.194 An OEIC is established 
under company law rather than trust law. The OEIC owns the underlying 
assets and investors own shares that reflect their interests in those assets. 
The OEIC must have a board, though the only board member required is the 
authorized fund manager. Although independent directors are permitted, in 
practice nearly all OEIC boards are comprised of the manager alone. In 
addition, there must be a depository who has the same responsibilities for 
custody and oversight that the trustee has in the unit trust. 
OEICs were designed to replicate the characteristics of unit trusts but 
with a corporate structure. For all practical purposes, the two are identical 
from the investor’s standpoint. The OEIC provides a vehicle recognized in 
continental Europe; there were no other advantages seen to the corporate 
form. In both the OEIC and unit trust, the authorized fund manager makes 
the day-to-day investment decisions of the fund, prices portfolio assets, and 
maintains financial records. The role of the trustee and the depository are 
essentially identical, to safeguard portfolio assets, oversee the manager’s 
activities, and ensure compliance with FSA rules. FSA regulation is the 
cornerstone of investor protection in the United Kingdom. 
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Investors in each country have, at best, a minimal role in fund 
governance. In Germany and Japan, investors have no voting rights.195 In 
the United Kingdom, investors of unit trusts can vote on only four matters: 
changing the trust deed, approving departures from stated investment 
policy, removing the manager, and approving trust mergers.196 
The “product” structure, compared to the “board” structure, of mutual 
fund regulation makes clear that investors are purchasing services from an 
investment management firm. The buck stops with the government 
regulator, who has collateral support from courts that enforce the fiduciary 
duties of the management firm and (in some countries) from self-regulatory 
organizations that set standards of professional conduct. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At the time of the 1940 Act, it was inconceivable that the fund board 
would oversee fund families with hundreds of different funds, spanning the 
full range of modern investment styles, some with over $1 trillion in assets 
under management. Equally unimaginable was the reality that mutual funds 
would become the primary investment vehicle for private retirement 
savings—surpassing company pension plans, bank accounts, and brokerage 
investments. And still more far-fetched was the likelihood, or so it seems, 
that mutual funds would supplant or even absorb the federal social security 
system as the funding vehicle for retirement income. 
Regulatory outsourcing was an innovation of the 1940 Act—in marked 
contrast to the multi-faceted regulatory approach applied to public offerings 
under the 1933 Act and the nod to self-regulation of securities firms and 
stock exchanges under the 1934 Act. Rather than external supervision by 
the SEC or a self-regulatory organization (none existed), Congress 
delegated supervision to an internal regulator. 
At best, the mutual fund board is an anachronism, a throw back to the 
time that the mutual fund was seen as an investment holding company (on 
the model of Berkshire-Hathaway) and the fund board a servant of investor 
interests. But the board suffers from fundamental structural flaws. 
Independent directors are neither independent of the management firm nor 
truly capable of being directors. They are selected by the management firm, 
rely on it for information and direction, and are paid (sometimes 
handsomely) not according to the results for fund investors, but based on 
currying continuing favor with the firm they are supposed to supervise. 
They are effectively limited in their power to fire the management firm, to 
revamp the business or sell it to outside buyers, or to enter into tough 
negotiations on behalf of fund investors. 
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The evidence bears out the fund board’s inherent weakness and leads to 
the unavoidable conclusion that internal regulation cannot but fail. In a 
market that lacks effective arbitrage mechanisms to bring fund expenses 
into line, the board has no effective means to truly regulate management 
fees and ensure that fund marketing is in the interests of fund investors. Not 
surprisingly, as the mutual fund industry has exploded in size, and during a 
period of unparalleled advances in computer and telecommunications 
technology, the economies of scale and operational efficiencies have 
redounded to the benefit of management firms, not fund investors. 
Likewise, fund boards have approved loads and marketing fees that increase 
market share, thus boosting fees for the management firm, but without any 
benefit for fund investors. Rather than focusing fund marketing on investor 
education, the fund board has permitted advertising that exploits the 
informational defects and cognitive foibles of fund investors. 
It is remarkable that in an industry widely described as heavily 
regulated, the board-centric structure faces so little accountability. Each of 
the potential sources of board monitoring—the SEC, federal courts, state 
courts—has adopted the attitude that somebody is doing the job. The SEC 
ultimately assumes that fund investors acting in markets will discipline 
wayward boards; the federal courts defer to the investor market and the 
regulatory function of the SEC; and state courts apply the business 
judgment rule, which assumes that markets are more discerning than 
judges. 
At worst the fund board creates an illusion of investor protection. It 
allows the industry to tell the appealing story (however false) that the board 
serves as a “watchdog” against internal malfeasance, while fund investors 
exercise their powerful “entry/exit” rights to discipline management firm 
over-charging, over-trading, and over-marketing. The very existence of an 
internal monitor may actually be counter-productive. Rather than 
constraining management excesses, the presence of the supposedly indepen-
dent board may actually embolden management firms to disregard their 
responsibility to fund investors, on the glib belief that the board performs its 
functions. Behavioral studies show that fiduciaries led to believe that 
someone else is protecting the interests of their beneficiaries tend to 
minimize and slacken their own fiduciary performance.197 A lackadaisical 
watchdog may be worse than no watchdog at all. 
Look again there. 
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